Received in my mail box today!
No surprise who the fuckwits are here!
Instant Alert: This Is What A US Strike On Iran's Nuclear Facilities Could Look Like
Bi-partisan foreign policy think tank the Center For Strategic
& International Studies took a long hard look at what it really means to
thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions, what it would take, and what it could lead to
in a report released yesterday.
The speculation that Israel can go it alone against Tehran remains,
but the specifics of what's required by a US attack to put the nuclear program
in the dust is outlined in detail. At least 16 F-18s, 10 B-2 bombers carrying
30,000 pound Massive Ordnance
Penetrator bombs, would initially be required by US
forces.
Iran's retaliation would be another story entirely with a massive
incoming missile salvo directed about the entire region. When that happens a
full Ballistic Missile War would ensue with untold US space, air, sea, and land
elements coming into play.
Some illustrations of the possible outcomes are
below.
Penetrator bombs, would initially be required by US
forces.
Two U.S.
Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles and a B-2 bomber fly in
formation.
Should the
U.S. actually take Benjamin Netanyahu’s advice and attack Iran, don’t expect a
few sorties flown by a couple of fighter jocks. Setting back Iran’s nuclear
efforts will need to be an all-out effort, with squadrons of bombers and fighter
jets, teams of commandos, rings of interceptor missiles and whole Navy carrier
strike groups — plus enough drones, surveillance gear, tanker aircraft and
logistical support to make such a massive mission go. And all of it, at best,
would buy the U.S. and Israel another decade of a nuke-free
Iran.
There’s
been a lot of loose talk and leaked tales about what an attack on Iran might
ultimately entail. Anthony Cordesman, one of Washington’s best-connected defense
analysts, has put together a remarkably detailed inventory of what it would take
to strike Iran, cataloging everything from the number of bombers required to the
types of bombs they ought to carry. He analyzes both Israeli and American
strikes, both nuclear and not. He examines possible Iranian counterattacks, and
ways to neutralize them.
It leads
Cordesman to a two-fold conclusion:
* “Israel
does not have the capability to carry out preventive strikes that could do more
than delay Iran’s efforts for a year or two.” Despite the increasingly sharp
rhetoric coming out of Jerusalem, the idea of Israel launching a unilateral
attack is almost as bad as allowing Tehran to continue its nuclear work
unchallenged. It would invite wave after wave of Iranian counterattacks —
by missile, terrorist, and a boat — jeopardizing countries throughout the
region. It would wreak havoc with the world’s oil supply. And that’s if Israel
even manages to pull the mission off — something Cordesman very much
doubts.
* The U.S.
might be able to delay the nuclear program for up to 10 years. But to do so,
it’ll be an enormous undertaking. The initial air strike alone will “require a
large force allocation [including] the main bomber force, the suppression of
enemy air defense system[s], escort aircraft for the protection of the bombers,
electronic warfare for detection and jamming purposes, fighter sweep and combat
air patrol to counter any air retaliation by Iran.”
But the
first attack might actually be the easy part, writes Cordesman, an expert at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
A
depiction of the ballistic-missile battle that could follow an American strike
on Iran.
At the
same time, the U.S. has to keep Iran from blocking the ultra-important Strait of
Hormuz, the 21-mile-wide waterway through which flows around 20 percent of the
world’s oil and liquid natural gas supplies. And America has to protect its
energy-producing allies in the Persian Gulf, or else there will be no oil or gas
to send through the Strait.
That will
be no mean task, Cordesman writes: “Iran can cherry pick its targets in
an effort to pressure and intimidate the U.S. and Southern Gulf states. It can
use long-range conventionally armed missiles or drones against large military or
urban targets as terror weapons. It can attack sporadically and unpredictably in
a war of attrition or attempt to ‘swarm’ U.S. and Gulf naval
forces.”
Some of
this defensive work has already begun. To keep the Strait open, the U.S. has
kept up a steady patrol of aircraft carriers and stationed gunboats,
minesweepers, and robot subs in nearby Bahrain. To spot Iran’s missiles — many
of which can hit their targets in as little as four minutes — the U.S. is
building a next-generation X-band radar station in Qatar. To knock those short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles out of the sky, America has sold
billions of dollars’ worth of Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Air Defense
interceptors to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Those
anti-missiles will be augmented by U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers equipped
with Aegis ballistic-missile defense systems — one of the most-proven components
in the American interceptor stockpile.
But to
make sure Tehran’s missiles don’t hit Riyadh or Kuwait City, the U.S. will have
to take out Iran’s eight ballistic-missile bases and 15 missile production
facilities, and 22 launch facilities if a preemptive strike is ever ordered.
America will “need to destroy as many missile launchers as possible … in
order to reduce number of incoming warheads,” Cordesman writes. Each target will
require two aircraft each — either carrier-launched F/A-18s or F-15Es and
F-16Cs flying from nearby air bases — for a total of 90
jets. Auxiliary targets could include Iran’s refineries, its power
grid, its military bases, and its roads and bridges.
American
jets and fighters will be pretty much free to fire at will — the Iranian air
force is a joke, and its air defense systems don’t have the sensors or the
networking to seriously threaten U.S. jets. Still, those air defenses and enemy
fighters will have to be taken out before they manage to get off a lucky
shot.
Drones
will be deployed for further intelligence, “deception, jamming, harassment,
or destruction of enemy forces and air defense systems.” Special operations
forces will conduct “direct action missions, special reconnaissance, and provide
terminal guidance for attacks against valuable enemy targets.” Somehow,
attacks from Iran’s terrorist allies — including Hamas and Hezbollah — will have
to be blunted, as well.
And then,
of course, there’s the main attack.
Destroying
each of Iran’s five nuclear facilities will require a pair of B-2 bombers flying
out of Diego Garcia. Every plane will carry two of the U.S. military
next-gen, king-sized bunker-busters, the 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordinance
Penetrator. The “GPS-guided weapon contain[s] more than 5,300 pounds of
conventional explosives inside a 20.5 foot-long bomb body of hardened steel. It
is designed to penetrate dirt, rock and reinforced concrete to reach enemy
bunker or tunnel installations,” writes Cordesman, who believes such bomb can
set back Iran’s nuclear ambitions for years.
Israel
might - might - be able to pull off a similar strike, but only
just barely. It’ll require using a quarter of the Israel Air Force’s fighters,
and all of its tanker planes, leaving no aircraft for all these other secondary
targets. The jets will have to hug the Syrian-Turkish border before flying
over both Iraq and Iran. And that is not exactly friendly territory.
“The number of aircraft required, refueling along the way and getting to
the targets without being detected or intercepted would be complex and high
risk and would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a
high success rate,” Cordesman writes.
And even
if the reactors are hit, the ”Iranian retaliation will have a devastating
regional consequences,” he adds. You don’t even want to know what the Middle
East would look like the day after Israel attempts a nuclear strike on
Iran.
Which
leaves the American attack option. It may be technically possible. “It’s clear
that if the United States did it we would have a hell of a bigger impact,”
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said in the spring. Cordesman would rather see
negotiations instead: “The brief shows just how dangerous any war in
the Gulf could be to the world’s economy.” Some politicians may be calling for a
preemptive strike on Iran. There’s a reason military planners are so
wary.
Oil
Transit Chokepoints
•The
Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline:
• Oil
Flow: 4.5 million bbl/d
•The
Strait of Hormuz:
• Oil
Flow: 16.5 million bbl/d
Strait of
Hormuz
• At its
narrowest point, the Strait is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane
in either direction is only two miles, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The
Strait is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers,
with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000
deadweight tons.
• Flows
through the Strait in 2011 were roughly 35 percent of all seaborne traded oil,
or
almost 20
percent of oil traded worldwide. More than 85 percent of these crude oil exports
went to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South Korea, and China representing
the largest destinations.
• In
addition, Qatar exports about 2 trillion cubic feet per year of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for almost 20 percent
of global LNG trade.
Furthermore, Kuwait imports LNG volumes that travel northward through
the Strait of
Hormuz.
These flows totaled about 100 billion cubic feet per year in
2010.
Israeli
Preventive Strike Options
Scenario
I: Israeli Airforce Combat Aircraft
• It is
possible that Israel will carry out a strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities,
if the U.S. does not, with the objective of either destroying the program or
delaying it for some years. The success of the Strike Mission will be measured
by how much of the Enrichment program has it destroyed, or the number of years
it has delayed
Iranian
acquisition of enough Uranium or Plutonium from the Arak reactor to build a
nuclear bomb.
• We
conclude that a military strike by Israel against Iranian Nuclear Facilities is
possible and the optimum route would be along the Syrian-Turkish border then
over a small portion of Iraq then into Iran, and back the same route. However,
the number of aircraft required, refueling along the way and getting to the
targets without being detected or intercepted would be complex and high risk and
would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success
rate.
• The U.S.
would certainly be perceived as being a part of the conspiracy and having
assisted and given Israel the green light, whether it did or had no part in it
whatsoever. This would undermine the U.S. objectives in increasing stability in
the region and bringing about a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It will also harm for a very long period of time relations between the U.S. and
its close regional allies.
• Another
scenario is in using Low Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons as a substitute
for conventional weapons to attack deeply buried nuclear facilities in Iran.
Some believe that these are the only weapons that can destroy targets deep
underground or in tunnels.
• The U.S.
would not allow any other country, even a strong ally such as Israel, to use
them, unless another country had used nuclear weapons against the U.S. and its
allies.
• A strike
by Israel on Iran will give rise to the regional instability and conflict as
well as terrorism. The regional security consequences will be
catastrophic.
Mission
Analysis:
Approximate range to the furthest target Esfahan is some 1,110 nmi.
When approaching the 550 nmi range, the F-15Es and F-16Is need to refuel on the
way to Iran and on the way back.
Refueling
can be done in three ways:
o
Refueling from KC-135A and KC-10 tankers.
o Buddy
Refueling between F-15Es and F-16Is
o A
temporary landing strip, along the Syrian, Turkish and Northern Iraq region,
where aircraft refueling is available.
Total Fuel
in an F-15E for the Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi strike mission is 26,300 lbs, whereas that for
an F-16I is about 14,755 lbs. The total maximum strike package was around 80
aircraft, all the 30 F-15I in the Israeli Air force Inventory plus 55 F-16I/C.
The F-15E would then need 5 to 6 KC-130s to refuel from, and the F-16Is would
require 6 to 7 KC-130.
Israel
presently has 5 KC-130H and 4 B-700 (Source IISS). So all the Israeli Tankers
will have to be airborne to service the F-15E and F-16I Strike Force during the
outbound leg and inbound legs of the mission. Could be difficult to find a
location along the route such that the tankers could avoid detection and
possible interception.
These
estimates were done assuming a 100% aircraft and weapons operational reliability
and the strike force not encountering any Iranian Air and Ground Defense.
So if we
give the overall reliability to be 90% then we should add around 9 to 10 more
aircraft, bringing the total strike force to 95.
So in essence over 25% of the high end combat aircraft of Israeli
Airforce and 100% of the Tankers will have to be allocated for this
mission.
Israeli
Preventive Strike Options
Scenario
II: Low Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons
• Another
scenario is using these warheads as a substitute for conventional weapons to
attack deeply buried nuclear facilities in Iran. Some believe that nuclear
weapons are the only weapons that can destroy targets deep underground or in
tunnels.
• The
gun-type Uranium based nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima by the U.S. in August
of 1945 was about 8,000 pounds in weight, and contained about 60 kg of weapons
grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), of which about 0.7 kg underwent fission
producing a Yield of 12.5 kilotons. The Plutonium implosion bomb dropped
on
Negasaki
weighed about 10,800 pounds and contained about 6.4 kg of weapons-grade
Plutonium PU-239.
Producing
a yield of 22 kilotons. in the subsequent years the U.S. was able to produce
Plutonium-implosion nuclear bombs in the same yield range with weights down to
2,000 lbs and less.
• If
Ballistic Missiles are used to carry out the mission, Israel has have a
Ballistic Missile Defense System whereas Iran does not have one, such as the
Russian S-300PMU2 “Favorit”, that was designed to intercept ballistic missiles
as well as combat aircraft.
US
Simulations of the Consequences of an Israeli Strike.
• A
classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an
Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional
war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead,
according to American officials.
• The
officials said the so-called war game was not designed as a rehearsal for
American military action— and they emphasized that the exercise’s results were
not the only possible outcome of a real-world conflict.
• But the
game has raised fears among top American planners that it may be impossible to
preclude American involvement in any escalating confrontation with Iran, the
officials said. In the debate among policy makers over the consequences of any
Israeli attack, that reaction may give stronger voice to those in the White
House, Pentagon and intelligence community who have warned that a strike could
prove perilous for the United States.
• The
results of the war game were particularly troubling to Gen. James N. Mattis, who
commands all American forces in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Southwest
Asia, according to officials who either participated in the Central Command
exercise or who were briefed on the results and spoke on condition of anonymity
because of its classified nature. When the exercise had concluded earlier this
month, according to the officials, General Mattis told aides that an
Israeli first strike would be likely to
have dire
consequences across the region and for United States forces
there.
• The
two-week war game, called Internal Look, played out a narrative in which the
United States found it was pulled into the conflict after Iranian missiles
struck a Navy warship in the Persian Gulf, killing about 200 Americans,
according to officials with knowledge of the exercise. The United States then
retaliated by carrying out its own strikes on Iranian nuclear
facilities.
• The
initial Israeli attack was assessed to have set back the Iranian nuclear program
by roughly a year, and the subsequent American strikes did not slow the Iranian
nuclear program by more than an additional two years.
However,
other Pentagon planners have said that America’s arsenal of long-range bombers,
refueling aircraft and precision missiles could do far more damage to the
Iranian nuclear program — if President Obama were to decide on a full-scale
retaliation.
• The
exercise was designed specifically to test internal military communications and
coordination among battle staffs in the Pentagon; in Tampa, Fla., where the
headquarters of the Central Command is located; and in the Persian Gulf in the
aftermath of an Israeli strike. But the exercise was written to assess a
pressing, potential, real-world situation. In the end, the war game reinforced
to military officials the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of a strike by
Israel, and a counterstrike by Iran, the officials said.
• American
and Israeli intelligence services broadly agree on the progress Iran has made to
enrich uranium. But they disagree on how much time there would be to prevent
Iran from building a weapon if leaders in Tehran decided to go ahead with
one.
• With the
Israelis saying publicly that the window to prevent Iran from building a nuclear
bomb is closing, American officials see an Israeli attack on Iran within the
next year as a possibility. They have said privately that they believe that
Israel would probably give the United States little or no warning should Israeli
officials make the decision to strike Iranian nuclear
sites.
•
Officials said that, under the chain of events in the war game, Iran believed
that Israel and the United States were partners in any strike against Iranian
nuclear sites and therefore considered American military forces in the Persian
Gulf as complicit in the attack. Iranian jets chased Israeli warplanes after the
attack, and Iranians
launched
missiles at an American warship in the Persian Gulf, viewed as an act of war
that allowed an American retaliation.
